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FEDERAL AGENCY INVESTIGATIONS: PROCEDURAL
RIGHTS OF THE SUBPOENAED WITNESS
Frank C. Newman*
information that federal agencies seek they get without
forcing people to testify. Sometimes, however, when investigators on their own cannot uncover the facts and an informed
person refuses to cooperate, he will be summoned to appear and
answer questions, under penalty of contempt for refusal.
Many questions he need not answer. Agencies may not abridge
his first amendment rights, for example, or deny him benefits of
the privilege against self-incrimination or the common-law privileges. Further, the Administrative Procedure Act states that "No
process . . . shall be issued, made, or enforced in any manner or
for any purpose except as authorized by law"; and courts may
enforce a summons only "to the extent that it is found to be in
accordance with law." 1 Thus the relevant statutes and regulations
are to be combed for technical requirements, and subpoenaed witnesses can insist that the inquiry be within the agency's authority
and that all information sought be reasonably pertinent.2
Those substantive rights of witnesses were discussed at length
in the 1950's. There is a rich literature on what questions are
Iawful.3 But there has been no parallel discussion of witnesses'
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1 Administrative Procedure Act § 6, 60 Stat. 240 (1946) , 5 U.S.C. §§ 1005 (b), (c)
(1958). Concerning the force of a threat to impose judicial penalties, see 1 DAVIS, AD·
MINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.11 (1958) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS]; GELLHORN &:
BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 605-11 (4th ed. 1960); cf. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland,
315 U.S. 357, 363 (1942).
2 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950); D. G. Bland Lumber
Co. v. NLRB, 177 F.2d 555, 558 (5th Cir. 1949). "The statutes bestowing this [subpoena] power have not been uniform in providing means for and eliininations [liinitations?) upon its exercise and enforcement methods and sanctions." An'y GEN. COMM.
ON An. PROCEDURE REPORT 414 (1941). For tabular presentation of technical requirements, see id. 415-35.
3 See 1 DAVIS, §§ 3.01-3.14 ("Investigation') ; 2 id. § 14.08 nn. 23-25 (common-law
privileges) ; McNaughton, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 51 J. CRIM. L., C.
& P.S. 138 (1960). The McNaughton article also discusses "1st Amendment Privilege" at
145 n.37, and other privileges at 150 n.52. Cf. Judge Stanley Barnes' instructive opinion
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procedural rights, and some comments that have appeared are
disturbingly inaccurate.4 Further, the Supreme Court has now
pronounced on the subject in Hannah v. Larche; 5 and parts of the
Justices' opinions are puzzling, as we shall see.
This article is designed to help fill a gap in the literature and
to warn government attorneys, particularly, about some questionable asides in the Hannah case. We shall not deal with recordkeeping requirements or with agency inspections, subpoenas duces
tecum, and related search and seizure problems. The focus instead is on the subpoenaed witness; 6 that is, a man who knows
that force may be used against him unless pursuant to government
command he appears and answers questions. 7 We examine several
rights that may protect the witness; 8 and we shall also ask whether
the agencies, to discharge their governmental duties, truly need
the subpoena power.
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

Our Supreme Court Justices still quarrel as to the constitutional right of a witness to be represented by counsel.9 Fortunately,
in Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960) ; Griswold, The Right To Be Let Alone,
55 Nw. U.L. REv. 216 (1960); Note, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 347 (1957) •
4 See, e.g., Note, 54 HARV. L. REv. 1214, 1216 (1941) ("Since the results of an investigation are not conclusive against a witness, the due process clause would seem to
impose no restraints on administrative inquiries."); Note, 35 NoTRE DAME LAw. 440,
441 (1960) ("[T]he privilege against self-incrimination ..• would seem to be the only
protection these witnesses have ••••"); cf. TAYLOR, GRAND INQ.UESI' 242 (1955);
Liacos, Rights of Witnesses Before Congressional Committees, 33 B.U.L. REv. 337, 383
(1953) ("There is no judicial enforcement of minimum procedures • • • .") ; Note,
1 N.Y.L.F. 6 (1955) .
o 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
6 Our aim here is to identify the rights of a witness who is subject to sanctions for
contumacy or whose answers, because of government-sponsored publicity, may tend to
defame, degrade, or incriminate him. We do not examine rights that inhere in other
threatened deprivations of his liberty or property (by adjudication, for example) •
7 Commands that a person fill out a questionnaire or submit a report are similar to
subpoenas ad testificandum; but they do not involve a personal appearance, and the
procedural rights thus differ. If a witness has appeared and would be subject to
penalty for refusal to answer (e.g., if he refuses to tell "the whole truth") he should
be entitled to the rights of a subpoenaed witness even though he originally may have
appeared voluntarily.
8 The rights examined here apply to all witnesses, I believe, whether the proceedings
are purely investigatory or are designed to aid adjudication and rule-making. ·witnesses
who are also parties may have additional rights, of course, which are catalogued in
chapters 6 to 16 of I, 2 DAVIS, §§ 6.01-16.14.
9 See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 451 n.31 (1960); id. at 493 Gustices Harlan
and Clark concurring) ; id. at 486 (Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring) . But in the
Hannah case there was no dispute on the right to counsel, and the Court's seeming
approval of § 102 (c) of the Civil Rights Act ("Witnesses at the hearings may be
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that due process question has little application to federal agencies.
They are nearly all subject to the Administrative Procedure Act; 10
and in that act section 6 (a) states, "Any person compelled to appear in person before any agency or representative thereof shall
be accorded the right to be accompanied, represented, and advised
by counsel . . . ." 11 There are no exceptions, and the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has reminded us that the guarantee
is worth taking at face value. 12
THE RIGHT TO A TRANSCRIPT

Just as he often needs counsel, a witness may need to know
exactly what were his answers to questions he was forced to answer.
Again the APA is clear (and its words suggest that the draftsmen had in mind some cases that did require attention13). Section
6 (b) states, "Every person compelled to submit data or evidence shall be entitled to retain or, on payment of lawfully prescribed costs, procure a copy or transcript thereof, except that in
accompanied by their own counsel for the purpose of advising them concerning their
constitutional rights.'') is at best weak dictum. 363 U.S. at 433; cf. id. at 492 (Mr.
Justice Frankfurter concurring) . It can be argued first, that that section does not
supersede § 6 (a) of the APA; and second, that it is unconstitutionally restrictive. See
Newman, Some Facts on Fact-Finding by an Investigatory Commission, 13 Ju,. L. REv.
120, 127 (1961). The Court overlooked similar arguments that FTC and SEC restrictions on the right to counsel are illegal. 363 U.S. at 446, 447 n.26; cf. Backer v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1960).
10 See Newman, What Agencies Are Exempt from the Administrative Procedure Act?,
36 NoTRE DAME LAw. 320 (1961). Concerning exempt agencies, see Niznik v. United
States, 173 F.2d 328, 336 (6th Cir. 1949) (Selective Service); Lopez v. Madigan, 174
F. Supp. 919, 921 (N.D. Cal. 1959) (Parole Board). The Niznik case, relying as it
does on United States v. Pitt, 144 F.2d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 1944) ("[H]e at no time
requested ••• counsel ••• .''), is doubtful authority. Michel v. Louisville &: N.R.R.,
188 F.2d 224, 226 n.6 (5th Cir. 1951), is of limited relevance because the National Railroad Adjustment Board exercises no subpoena power.
We know too little about the right of a witness to have the tribunal assign counsel
to him. Cf. United States ex rel. Castro-Louzan v. Zimmerman, 94 F. Supp. 22, 25 (E.D.
Pa. 1950) ; Kramer, The Place and Function of Judicial Review in the Administrative
Process, 28 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 72 (1959) ; and see Jacobson v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 728
(3d Cir. 1940) (no free transcript) ; Rackow, The Right to Counsel-Time for Recognition Under the Due Process Clause, IO W. REs. L. REv. 216 (1959) .
11 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005 (a) (1958).
12 Backer v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1960) (freedom to select counsel
upheld) . Section 6 governs, "Except as otherwise provided in this Act .•• .'' 60 Stat. 240
(1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005 (1958). With respect to the right to counsel there appear to
be no such exceptions. See generally 1 DAVIS § 8.10; GELLHORN &: BYSE, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 594-95.
13 In re SEC, 84 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1936); United States v. Mascuch, 30 F. Supp. 976
(S.D.N.Y. 1939); SEC v. Torr, 15 F. Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1936); cf. Edwards v. United
States, 312 U.S. 473, 481 (1941).
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a nonpublic investigatory proceeding the witness may for good
cause be limited to inspection of the official transcript of his
testimony." 14
PUBLIC OR PRIVATE HEARING?

The sentence just quoted assumes that "nonpublic" investigatory proceedings are permissible. A witness apparently has no
constitutional right to be heard in public.15 But constitutional
rights may evolve from an improper denial of his request that
the hearing be private.16 And many statutes and regulations require that some investigative proceedings be private, others public.17 As yet there have been few discussions of this whole problem, and its perplexities will not be explored here.18
THE RIGHT TO NOTICE

Would this subpoena be legal? "You must appear at the
address shown below next Monday at 10:00 a.m. before an official
who, and to answer questions which, at that time will be identified." If our witness had no other notice as to the content of
questions that might be asked, his lack of preparation could even
impede the government's need for information. Yet there are
cases implying that that subpoena constitutionally could be enforced.19
60 Stat. 240 (1946) , 5 U.S.C. § 1005 (b) (1958) .
See Anonymous v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287, 294 (1959); In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330
(1957); Bowles v. Baer, 142 F.2d 787, 789 (7th Cir. 1944); Woolley v. United States, 97
F.2d 258, 262 (9th Cir. 1938); cf. Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States,
288 U.S. 294, 322 (1933).
16 Cf. Bank of America Nat'l Trust &: Sav. Ass'n v. Douglas, 105 F.2d 100, 105 (D.C.
Cir. 1939),; Herold v. Herold China &: Pottery Co., 257 Fed. 9II, 917 (6th Cir. 1919);
Note, 35 IND. L.J. 251 (1960) ; Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 509 (1958) . "[F]or many defendants
undeserved publicity could in its own way become as much a source of injustice as secrecy
ever has been." Rourke, Law Enforcement Th,·ough Publicity, 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 225,
246 (1957).
17 See, e.g., Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 788, 49 U.S.C. § 1481 (1958); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 848, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-10 (b), (c) (1958) (private) ; Food
and Drug Rules, 21 C.F.R. § 285.17 (1955) (private); Tariff Commission Rules, 19
C.F.R. § 201.ll (1961) (refers to statutes requiring public hearings) ; cf. E. Griffith
Hughes, Inc. v. FTC, 63 F.2d 362 (D.C. Cir. 1933); SEC v. Harrison, 80 F. Supp. 226,
229 (D.D.C. 1948) .
18 See l DAVIS § 8.09.
19 See the following grand jury cases: In re Black, 47 F.2d 542, 543 (2d Cir. 1931);
In re Meckley, 50 F. Supp. 274, 275 (M.D. Pa. 1943) ; cf. Eisler v. United States, 170 F.2d
273, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1948). United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950),
states that the demand must not be "too indefinite"; and in GELLHORN &: BYSE, op. dt.
supra note 1, at 579, there is a quotation from a Solicitor General's brief indicating a
concession by the government (nearly twenty years ago) that a subpoena may be resisted
14

15
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I. What Is the Practice in Federal Agencies? So far as I know,
no scholar or anyone else has ever studied a fair sampling of
investigatory proceedings to find out whether subpoenaed witnesses, in fact, are denied basic information regarding the questions
they will be asked. The Supreme Court made a survey of sorts
in Hannah v. Larche, and comments on that survey seem called
for. The question in Hannah was whether a federal court erred
when it issued this injunction:
"[D]efendants ... [members of the United States Commission on Civil Rights] are enjoined and restrained from conducting the proposed hearing in Shreveport, Louisiana,
wherein plaintiff registrars, accused of depriving others of
the right to vote, would be denied the right of apprisal,
confrontation and cross-examination." 20
The Supreme Court concluded that the lower court had erred,
and vacated the injunction. The majority opinion states:
"The history of investigations conducted by the executive
branch of the Government is ... marked by a decided absence of those procedures here in issue. The best example is
provided by the administrative regulatory agencies. Although these agencies normally make determinations of a
quasi-judicial nature, they also frequently conduct purely
fact-finding investigations. When doing the former, they are
governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, ... and the
parties to the adjudication are accorded the traditional safeguards of a trial. However, when these agencies are conducting non-adjudicative, fact-finding investigations, rights such
as apprisal, confrontation, and cross-examination generally
do not obtain." 21
Mr. Justice Douglas in dissent-with Mr. Justice Black's approval
-had this to say about that statement:
"References are made to federal statutes governing numerous
administrative agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission
and the Securities and Exchange Commission; and the inference is that what is done in this case can be done there.
This comes as a surprise to one who for some years was engaged in those administrative investigations. No effort was
on the ground that it is "unduly vague." Cf. Perry &: Simon, The Civil Investigative
Demand: New Fact-Finding Powers for the Antitrust Division, 58 MICH. L. REv. 855, 866
(1960) ("Notice'') .
20 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 429 (1960).
21 Id. at 445.
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ever made, so far as I am aware, to compel a person, charged
with violating a federal law, to run the gantlet of a hearing
over his objection. No objection based either on the ground
now advanced nor on the Fifth Amendment was, so far as
I know, ever overruled. Investigations were made; and they
were searching. Such evidence of law violations as was obtained was turned over to the Department of Justice. But
never before, I believe, has a federal executive agency attempted, over the objections of an accused, to force him
through a hearing to determine whether he has violated a
federal law. If it did, the action was lawless and the courts
should have granted relief. " 22
What is troubling is that the majority and the Douglas statements both seem inaccurate. Mr. Justice Douglas's suggestion that
no agency, over the objection of an accused, has ever forced that
accused through a hearing to see if he was guilty is rebutted even
by SEC cases.23 He does fairly ask, though, whether any objection
based "on the ground now advanced" (i.e., denial of apprisal,
confrontation, and cross-examination) has ever been overruled.
An analysis of the majority's response to his question, and of the
many authorities which were cited to demonstrate that "when
these agencies are conducting nonadjudicative, fact-finding investigations, rights such as apprisal, confrontation, and cross-examination generally do not obtain," appears elsewhere.24 The criticisms
there will not be repeated here. The author's conclusion is that
the Court did not present ". . . a sampling of investigatory proceedings that tells us whether subpoenaed witnesses, in fact, have
been denied rights of apprisal, confrontation, and cross-examination. The references . . . do not demonstrate any history that is
marked by a 'decided absence' of those rights." 25
Id. at 504.
See Loeb & Crary, 3 S.E.C. 324 (1938) , discussed at 40 n.80 of Arr'y GEN. COMM.
ON .AD. PROCEDURE SEC MONOGRAPH (1941); Edwards v. United States, 312 U.S. 473
(1941); ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 467 (1894); Genecov v. Federal Petroleum Dd.,
146 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1944); Bowles v. Baer, 142 F.2d 787 (7th Cir. 1944); In re SEC,
84 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1936); SEC v. Torr, 15 F. Supp 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1936). Supporting
Mr. Justice Douglas, see United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179 (1956); Arr'Y GEN.
COMM. ON .AD. PROCEDURE NLRB MONOGRAPH 5 n.20 (1941) ; cf. Ludlam, Tax Fraud
Investigations: A Plea for Constitutional Procedures, 43 A.B.A.J. 1009, 1010 (1957)
("until it decides against criminal prosecution, it will not issue a summons to the taxpayer ••.").
24 See Newman, Due Process, Investigations, and Civil Rights, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 735
(1961).
25 Id. at 767.
22
23
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2. What Does Due Process Require as to Notice'! In Hannah
the Court discussed the rights of "apprisal confrontation, and
cross-examination" as if they were all in one package. The Court's
treatment of the facts, though, suggests that there was no rejection
of a right to notice and that the word "apprisal" denotes something different from what most observers would call the right to
notice (i.e., notice to a witness of the kind of questions he may be
asked). The voting registrars who sought relief in Hannah had
been subpoenaed by the Civil Rights Commission, which has authority to investigate complaints that some people have improperly
deprived other people of the right to vote. With respect to apprisal
the Court stated,
"The specific constitutional question ... is whether persons
whose conduct is under investigation by a governmental
agency of this nature are entitled, by virtue of the Due Process Clause, to know the specific charges that are being investigated, as well as the identity of the complainants....26
"It should be noted that the respondents in these cases did
have notice of the general nature of the inquiry. The only
information withheld from them was the identity of specific
complainants and the exact charges made by those complainants. Because most of the charges related to the denial of
individual voting rights, it is apparent that the Commission
could not have disclosed the exact charges without also revealing the names of the complainants." 27
There may be doubt whether those last two sentences find support
in the record. 28 The holding, nevertheless, is that due process
was not violated when the "only information withheld" was the
identity of complainants and the exact charges they made. The
Court thus implies that a good deal more was known by these subpoenaed witnesses than the "general nature of the inquiry." By
no means did the Court approve an agency's denying to a witness
notice of the kind of questions he may be asked.
Moreover, the Court's own doctrine of pertinence assumes
some notice. That doctrine establishes that (I) a witness may
demand from his investigators enough data to . enable him to
26

21
28

Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 441 (1960).
Id. at 441 n.18.
See Newman, supra note 24, at 739 n.5.
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measure a question for its pertinence to the subject under inquiry,
and (2) that subject must not be identified too vaguely. 20
Existing cases do not, however, assure to an agency witness
the notice right that a distinguished American Bar Association
committee believed should be assured in legislative investigations.
They said, "The witness should receive proper notice of the subject matter to be considered in the hearing, so that he may know
generally what the committee is after, what kind of examination
he will be expected to face, and what evidence or pertinent information he should produce." 30 Should due process be construed
to require less than that, if the witness can show prejudice?
THE RIGHT To .ANswER COMPLETELY, To EXPLAIN, To REBUT

Not all notice comes from pre-hearing information. The test
is not whether a witness has had a chance to write out or memorize
his answers beforehand-so that his syntax will be admirable,
say, or his replies to embarrassing questions as subtly misleading
as possible. The test is whether an honest intent to answer truthfully might be perverted by surprise.
Can there be doubt that this statement, if truthful, is not
contemptuous? "I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, but I can't answer that
question because I don't trust my immediate recollection; and I
won't be able to tell 'the whole truth' until I have had a chance
to reflect on the matter (or look at my files, t~lk to my associates,
etc.) ." 31 That illustrates too that a witness sometimes need not
comply with a command to "Answer yes or no."
In this article we do not deal with proposals to allow a defamed, degraded, or incriminated non-witness to submit statements defending his repute. When by subpoena a man has been
compelled to appear, though, may government officials-while he
29 See NEWMAN &: SURREY, LEGISLATION 341-59 (1955); Slotnick, The Congressional
Investigating Power: Ramifications of the Watkins-Barenblatt Enigma, 14 MIAMI L.
R.Ev. 381, 397 (1960); Notes, 24 U. Cm. L. REv. 740, 746 (1957); 106 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 124,
125 n.14 (1957).
30 REPORT ON CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OF THE ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON
INDIVIDUAL RIGIITS AS AFFECTED BY NATIONAL SECURITY, Appendix 30 (1954).
31 The author recalls a World War II investigation where a harried government
official, brought in from the corridors of the House Office Building with no notice whatsoever, conscientiously took so long reflecting on his answers to questions about agency
policy that the committeemen, bored more than they could tolerate, finally adjourned
the hearing for lack of patience.
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is testifying or thereafter-fairly say: "Stop! You have no right
to explain your answers or rebut inferences that inhere in them"?
If the explanations or rebuttals are written, must they not be
received under the first amendment right "to petition the government"? And does not section 6 (a) of the APA create a supplementary right to appear in person for that purpose? It reads,
"So far as the orderly conduct of public business permits, any
interested person may appear ... for the presentation, adjustment,
or determination of any issue, request, or controversy in any
proceeding (interlocutory, summary, or otherwise) or in connection with any agency functions." 32 The value of that section and
of the right to petition too often has been overlooked. 33
CONFRONTATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION

Every subpoenaed witness is concerned with rights as to notice,
counsel, the course of reply and rebuttal, and a transcript. Those
rights seem reasonably guaranteed by either a generally applicable
statute (the APA) or due process. Rights of confrontation and
cross-examination are radically different. For some witnesses they
are impossible to grant, and they are generally guaranteed by
neither statute nor due process.
The reason they cannot apply to all witnesses is that in many
proceedings there is no one to confront or cross-examine. That is
the case, for example, when an agency subpoenas a man to ask
him about reports he has submitted. No third party need be involved. Similarly, if the subpoena has been inspired by an anonymous phone call, even though a third party is involved there is no
way to confront and cross-examine him. Accordingly, our analysis
can apply only when the questions put to a witness relate to a
known third party or one who could be identified.
For investigations the APA says nothing about confrontation
and cross-examination, and Hannah holds that no such rights
inhere in due process. The Court spoke emphatically and seemed
60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005 (a) (1958).
Concerning rules that require incorporation in the record, see Newman, Some
Facts on Fact-Finding by an Investigatory Commission, 13 An. L. R.Ev. 120, 126 (1961).
Concerning rights of non-witnesses, see Scott & King, Rules for Congressional Committees: An Analysis of House Resolution 447, 40 VA. L. R.Ev. 249, 268-71 (1954); cf. United
States v. Boyer, 150 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Cu.. Crv. PROC. CODE § 1019; Annot.,
170 A.L.R. 161 (1947).
32
33
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not to care whether the hearing was public or private; whether,
if private, later publicity might injure the witness; whether the
aim of the investigation was or was not to determine the need
for a follow-up adjudication; or whether third parties had filed
affidavits accusing the witness of misconduct or had testified in
his presence or had sought anonymity or immunity from questioning.
We will not guess whether Hannah is likely to be modified.
Even if its due process pronouncements stand, however, (1) as a
precedent it governs only those cases where the congressional
intent to deny confrontation and cross-examination seems clear,3''
and (2) the Court's discussion of "policy" hardly demonstrates
that, absent such intent, denial is advisable or that rights to confront and cross-examine should be withheld when new investigatory procedures are prescribed.35 Therefore it is desirable to
outline some ideas as to fairness and efficiency that judges, administrators, advocates, and procedure reformers should keep in
mind.
(1) Even when the questions put to a witness do relate to a
known third party or one who could be identified, we need not
in investigations impose rights greater than those which apply in
adjudications. In other words, enthusiasm for confronting and
cross-examining must be tempered by an awareness that administrative law history involves a wise rejection of many confrontation
and cross-examination rules that have governed trial courts (e.g.,
rigid doctrines of hearsay arid judicial notice) .36
(2) Wigmore's reminder that the main aim of confrontation
and cross-examination is efficiency (i.e., getting at the truth) is
impressive. 37 Yet to allow the rights in some proceedings would
be too complicating, too delaying, too costly. Rule-making proceedings provide an example; and the subpoenaing of a man to
testify as to practicable safety rules, say, scarcely requires for truthdetermining that he be allowed to confront and cross-examine all
other people who submitted data. The example calls to mind,
See 363 U.S. at 430-39.
See Newman, Due Process, Investigations, and Civil Rights, 8 U.C.L.A.L. R.Ev. 735,
744 (1961).
36 See GELLHORN 8: BYSE, op. cit. supra note l.
37 See Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress, 8 J. Pun.
L. 381 (1959); cf. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 31 (1954) .
34

35
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however, Kenneth Davis's legislative-adjudicative fact dichotomy. 38
Truth as to adjudicative facts in an investigation may well best
be assured by the testing we believe is advisable for such facts
in an adjudication.
(3) Facts that defame, degrade, or incriminate a subpoenaed
witness merit special treatment. It is one thing if they are kept
secret, or are used only by government officials who decide whether
to institute the kind of an adjudicatory proceeding where rights
to confront and cross-examine will be respected. It is something
else if there is no subsequent proceeding and if the adverse facts
are nonetheless publicized-before, during, or after the hearing
to which the witness has been subpoenaed. In that case, to the extent that identifiable third parties have supplied derogatory data,
does not decency require that confrontation and cross-examination
generally be allowed? Similarly, though borderlines between inquiries that are based on accusations and those that are not may
sometimes be dim, do not confrontation and cross-examination
seem peculiarly apt when, concededly, the investigation relates
to sworn accusations against the witness (the situation in Hannah)?
(4) Both ancient and recent history warn us about the faceless informer and the danger of using his tales as an excuse for
abridging a man's right to be let alone. 39 The Supreme Court has
now decided that in investigations, at least, the value of secret information offsets those dangers--or, more accurately, that Congress may permit accusatory data to be kept secret when Congress
concludes that its utility against a subpoenaed witness offsets its
risks. The fact that Hannah was a civil rights case, however, decided at a time when retaliations against the Negro who dared
protest discrimination were regularly headlined items, may suggest that persuasive evidence of the societal need for secrecy is
crucial. If the "informer system" must be protected-and there
are telling arguments in its favor 40-when should it be extended
to people who are not regularly employed confidential agents?
In cases where informers are to testify at the same hearing as
the subpoenaed witness (the situation in Hannah), is there any
reason why they should not be cross-examinable? And is there
38 1 DAVIS §§ 7.01, 7.02.
so See Pollit, supra note 37.
40 HARNEY&: CROSS, THE INFORJ\IER
EVIDENCE § 148 (1954).

IN LAW ENFORCEJ\IENT

81 (1960);

cf.

McCoRJ\IICK,
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justification for diluting the effectiveness of cross-examination
that could better be ensured in those cases by prior identification?u
(5) Even when cross-examination might be too complicating
or too delaying, could we not often allow confrontation? And
should we not sponsor substitutes for the kind of cross-examining
that traditionally has characterized criminal trials? (Consider, for
example, the technique of submitting questions to be put by the
presiding officer, so that he can evaluate them, rather than by
counsel for the witness directly.) And could we not also shield
efficiency by insisting that the witness demonstrate, through reference to what he believes is The Truth, his need to cross-examine?
That need was not considered in Hannah, unfortunately, because
the litigation there involved threatened rather than actual agency
proceedings. The Court might wisely have postponed its sweeping pronouncements until it knew exactly how the subpoenaed
registrars in fact were prejudiced.42
MISCELLANEOUS RIGHTS

If the witness in an investigation believes other people's testimony would help him, may he bring them in or have them
subpoenaed?43 May he insist that testimony affecting him be
sworn? Does he benefit from a Jencks rule or any discovery right
Cf. Newman, supra note 35, at 744.
Id •. at 745, 759.
43 APA § 6 (c) states: "Agency subpoenas authorized by law shall be issued to any
party upon request and, as may be required by rules of procedure, upon a statement or
showing of general relevance and reasonable scope of the evidence sought." 60 Stat. 240
(1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005 (c) (1958). Section 2 (b) tells us that "'Party' includes any
person ••. named or admitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of right to
be admitted as a party, in any agency proceeding . . . ." 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C.
§ 1001 (b) (1958) . When individuals have been named as parties to investigations, as occasionally they are [see, e.g., FTC Rules, 16 C.F.R. § 1.40 (1960) ], they can probably
benefit from § 6 (c) because § 6 (b), by the phrase "nonpublic investigatory proceeding"
indicates that an investigation is a proceeding. Professor Kenneth Davis says that to
regard all investigations as "proceedings" would strain the accepted meanings of APA
words too much. I DAVIS § 3.01 n.l; cf. id. § 8.10. Even if that is true, investigations
are clearly proceedings when they are aimed at the formulation of an order. See APA
§ i2 (d), 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (d) (1958); and for an illustration, see
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 335, 52 Stat. 1045 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 335 (1958):
"Before any violation of this Act is reported by the Secretary to any United States attorney for institution of a criminal proceeding, the person against whom such proceeding
is contemplated shall be given appropriate notice and an opportunity to present his
views, either orally or in writing, with regard to such contemplated proceeding." Cf.
United States v. Los Angeles & SL.R.R., 273 U.S. 299, 309 (1927) (property valuation
by ICC); 68 Stat. 938 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2135 (b) (1958) (AEC must report violations
of law to the Attorney General) •
41
42
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against the government?44 May he refuse to answer questions that
are uncivilized, indecent, vicious? Are investigators sometimes
so motivated by personal interest or prejudice that a whole proceeding becomes illegally tainted?
Observers who read the New York Times or the Washington
Post & Times Herald know that those questions are more than
hypothetical. A good many editorialists and some law reformers
have argued that, for legislative investigations, statutes recognizing
a variety of related rights should be enacted.45 So far as I know,
for agency investigations there is yet no common or constitutional
law which would make such statutes superfluous.
Sometimes, though, we credit too much the absence of precedent. The mere lack of cases on the question, say, whether witnesses ordered to appear in Washington, D. C., must pay their
own travel costs hardly makes us conclude that they must. Some
rules of fair dealing are so obvious that even warped investigators
recognize them. (E.g., witnesses who speak no English are entitled to translations; unheard questions must be repeated; reasonable recesses must be allowed.) And some scattered court
rulings on such questions as venue suggest that judges can do
justice even without the aid of authoritative prior pronouncements. 46
THE TRUE NEED FOR TESTIMONY

The discussion so far shows that, in investigations, procedural
problems range widely. To honor a subpoenaed witness's rights
requires reference to bulky statute and case law, and some wisdom and imagination besides. What might happen if, to ·avoid
complexities, we were to restrict the number of witnesses whose
cases create problems? Do government officials really need the
power to compel testimony?
Writing over thirty years ago (prior to the New Deal, even),
Professor Milton Handler made these comments:
44 See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 669 (1957); cf. GELLHORN &: BYSE, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 615 ("Is a Litigant Entitled To Compel Production of Government
Documents?', •
41i REPORT ON CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OF THE ABA SPECIAL COMMITI'EE ON
INDMDUAL RIGHTS AS AFFECTED BY NATIONAL SECURITY is the best over-all statement.
40 Bank of America Nat'l Trust &: Sav. Ass'n v. Douglas, 105 F.2d 100, 107 (D.C. Cir.
1939), 28 CALIF. L. REv. 240 (1940) (venue); In re Keegan, 18 F. Supp. 746, 748
(S.D.N.Y. 1937) ("The court will not give assistance to a summons if abuse is plainly
proved.'1 ; cf. United States v. O'Connor, 118 F. Supp. 248, 250 (D. Mass. 1953) •
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"How could the income tax laws be enforced if the Commissioner of Internal Revenue were denied the power to examine the books and records of taxpayers and to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of papers? How
could the Commissioner of Patents, the Commissioner of
Pensions, Immigration inspectors, the Comptroller discharge
their duties without similar or analogous powers? ... It was
not without reason that Congress invested the Secretaries of
Agriculture and Commerce, all departmental officials in the
investigation of claims against the government filed with
them, the President or his agents under Trading with the
Enemy Act, and the Director of War Risk Insurance with
similar powers ... [and] the same holds true for the Interstate Commerce, the Federal Trade, the Federal Power Commissions, the Shipping Board, and the China Registrar, which
in addition to determining rights and duties, promulgating
and enforcing regulation, conduct extensive investigations."47
In the same year, however, Ernst Freund concluded that "circumstances must be very exceptional indeed in which the authority
cannot make a prima fade case on the basis of information procured without resource to compulsory powers ...." 48 And David
Lilienthal two years earlier had suggested, "Before a legislative
body grants an unlimited power to compel the attendance and
testimony of witnesses, it should consider carefully whether the
legislative purposes cannot be effected without such a broad
grant." 49
By way of further answer to Professor Handler's questions, we
learned in 1941 from the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, first, that several agencies with functions
by no means unique do manage to get along without subpoena
power (Post Office, Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., Federal
Reserve Board, National Railroad Adjustment Board, National
Maritime Board, War Department); and, second, that other agencies empowered to issue subpoenas seem not to use them (Tariff
47 Handler, The Constitutionality of Investigations by the FTC, 28 CoLUM. L. R.Ev.
905, 925-27 (1928) • (Emphasis added.)
48 FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY 184 (1928) •
49 Lilienthal, The Power of Government Agencies To Compel Testimony, 39 HARV.
L. R.Ev. 694, 722 n.104 (1926).
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Commission, Railroad Retirement Board, Veterans Administration) .50
I do not imply that agencies need less power to (I) bring
witnesses into quasi-judicial hearings, (2) inspect premises and
documents, or (3) demand record-keeping and reports. Instead,
for "pure" investigation (distinguished from the kind of inquiry
that inheres in a quasi-judicial hearing), I wonder if agency
investigators truly have demonstrated either a dependence on
compelled testimony or a gain from such testimony that anywhere
near offsets the dangers that lurk in powers to compel. Professor
Davis has observed, "The litigated questions usually relate to
records and written reports, seldom to oral testimony." 51 And it
is probable that lack of litigation relates more to disuse of the
power to compel testimony than to lack of legal issues involving
its use.
Agency officials sometimes act like judges, sometimes like legislators, sometimes like prosecutors and police. "[P]olice have no
legal right to compel answers ...." 52 And as to prosecutors, judicial comments like these perhaps reflect a fundamental premise:
"I do not understand that a minor Government official can
summon people at will to give testimony about their affairs
and the affairs of their customers and neighbors. A United
States Attorney cannot do that." 53
"It would have been surprising had Congress attempted to
authorize the Nation's chief prosecuting officer and his subordinates to compel a citizen to appear in government private
offices to answer questions in secret about that citizen's conduct, associations, and beliefs. Some countries give such
power to their officials. It is to be hoped that this country
never will." 54
This country has given like power to many officials-even to a
ISO ATI'Y GEN. Co?.IM. ON AD. PROCEDURE REPORT 416-31 (1941); cf. Hannah v. Larche,
363 U.S. 420, 470 (1960) ("The [Food and Drug] Act makes no provision for compelling
testimony.'').
lSl l DAVIS § 3.02, at 164.
52 McNaughton, supra note 3, at 151 n.56.
53 Cook v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 445 (D. Ore. 1946) •
54 United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 195 (Mr. Justice Black concurring); cf. id.
at 191: [T]his Court construed congressional enactments as designed to safeguard
persons against compulsory questioning by law enforcement officers behind closed doors
•••"; Durbin v. United States, 221 F.2d 520, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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few "chief prosecuting officers"; 55 and the time may have arrived
to evaluate what thus the legislatures have wrought.
What might be the fate in Congress of a bill that read like this?
"All grants to any agency of the power to compel testimony other
than in an adjudicatory proceeding are hereby repealed; but
nothing in this Act shall affect the powers of courts, grand juries,
or committees of Congress; nor shall any power to require written
records and reports, to inspect, or to issue subpoenas duces tecum
be affected.''
First, would the glaring exemption of congressional committees be so discomfiting that Congress would choose not to face its
critics' scorn? I think not. We do need reforms for congressional
investigations. Yet that a few committees of Congress ask questions
which many people believe are improper hardly means that agency
officials should have the same power.56 Nor need the full
investigatory powers of Congress be delegated merely because
agency regulations often have the effect of statutes, for data-gathering resources other than subpoenas ad testificandum are typically
more available to agencies than to Congressmen. There are also
many reasons for withholding from appointed rather than elected
officials the use of forced testimony to promote "the stimulation
of public opinion and ... the conduct of political warfare." 57
Second, would federal agencies fight the proposed statute?
They could be expected to oppose it when the Bureau of the
Budget forwarded the bill for their written comments. But on
the stand-as witnesses before the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees, say-how many agency executives could conscientiously insist that they, as policemen and prosecutors, need powers
which for centuries with remarkable consistency we have denied
to ordinary police and prosecutors? How many could argue, m
55 See 1 DAVIS § 3.04, at 179; cf. Perry &: Sim.on, supra note 16.
56 Professor Davis argues that powers delegable to a congressional committee are
patently delegable to an administrative agency. 1 DAVIS § 53.04, at 175. That may be true
in constitutional law, but it does not follow that such powers should be delegated as a
matter of legislative policy. Cf. Langeluttig, Constitutional Limitations on Administra•
tive Power of Investigation, 28 ILL. L. REv. 508, 513 (1933) •
57 Dean Edward Levi, quoted in Newman, A Legal Look at Congress and the State
Legislatures, in LEGAL INsrrrtJTIONS TODAY AND TOMORROW 81 (Paulsen ed. 1959); and
see Newman, Some Facts on Fact-Finding by an Investigatory Commission, 13 AD. L. REv.
120, 129 (1961) •
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connection with their rule-making functions and their duties to
recommend legislation to Congress, that to be effective they
require the exposure powers, for example, of a Senator Kefauver
(on organized crime), or a Senator McClellan (on the crimes of
organized labor), or a Senator McCarthy (on the problems that
bothered him) ? How many could demonstrate that their agencies,
in fact, have relied on the power proposed to be withdrawn? Remember that subpoenas duces tecum, subpoenas in adjudicatory
proceedings, and miscellaneous powers to inspect and require reports would not be touched.
CONCLUSION

Concerning constitutional law, Professor Kenneth Davis has
advised that the spirit behind such statements as this pronouncement of Justice Stephen Field has become "utterly exhausted": 58
"A general, roving, offensive, inquisitorial compulsory investigation, conducted by a commission without any allegations,
upon no fixed principles, and governed by no rules of law, or
of evidence, and no restrictions except its own will, or caprice, is unknown to our constitution and laws; and such an
inquisition would be destructive to the rights of the citizen,
and an intolerable tyranny."

An impressive array of Supreme Court holdings demonstrate that
Professor Davis is correct, and flavor is added by quotes that show
approval, for instance, of "a power of inquisition ... which ...
can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated,
or even just because ... [the agency] wants assurance that it is
not." 50
The message of this article is (I) that apart from constitutional law, Justice Field's dictum merits re-examination, (2) that
Congress, agencies, and the courts could help reinvigorate the
spirit behind such dicta by recognizing some procedural rules that
would ensure basic decencies, and (3) that some perilous precedents could easily be offset by a statute that would restrict the
power to compel testimony to the kinds of proceedings where
58 1 DAVIS § 3.01, at 162 [quoting from In re Pacific Railway Comm'n, 32 F. 241, 263
(N.D. Cal. 1887) ].
59 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642 (1950) •
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history has shown that the potential abuses of that power are
tolerable. 60
60 I.e., agency adjudications, court and grand jury proceedings, and legislative in•
vestigations. In agency adjudications the rights identified in this article (counsel, tran•
script, notice, etc.) would be available to all witnesses; but our experience with court
trials, where witnesses' rights seem generally to have been protected, suggests that in
adjudication the subpoena power is significantly cushioned. The characterization of
grand jury and legislative abuses as "tolerable" does not mean that witnesses in those
proceedings should be denied the procedural rights proposed here for agency proceedings. The doubt is whether the public interest requires that agency investigators be given
the power to compel testimony, but there is no such doubt as to grand juries and legislative committees.

